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INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus doctrine, like most of American law, has and continues to undergo refinement since its inclusion in the original United States
Constitution.' Over the last several decades, the United States Supreme
Court (the "Supreme Court") and the United States Congress ("Congress") have embarked upon a series of attempts to curb the writ. A
succession of restrictive Supreme Court decisions, followed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996,2 were
intended to limit the availability of habeas relief, streamline the filing
* For their insightful comments, advice, and support, the author wishes to thank Professors Trevor Morrison and Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell Law School.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
2 104 P.L. 132; 110 Stat. 1214.
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and disposal of habeas petitions, and reduce the number of frivolous
habeas filings.
This note employs interrupted time series analysis to investigate the
impact of the Teague v. Lane3 retroactivity doctrine announced in 1989,
and AEDPA, which are widely regarded as being among the most severe
curtailments of habeas corpus relief of the last three decades. More specifically, this note evaluates the empirical impact of these two turning
points on (a) the success rates of habeas petitions, (b) habeas petition
filing rates, and (c) the efficiency of courts in disposing of both meritorious and meritless claims.
This note's findings suggest that, contrary to most scholars' characterization of Teague as severely restrictive, the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine has not resulted in a decreased probability of successfully
obtaining habeas relief. Furthermore, the permanent increase in the time
required to dispose of meritless claims following Teague indicates that
Teague's retroactivity doctrine undermines judicial efficiency by spawning a new set of issues and standards that are difficult to apply. The
findings also indicate that AEDPA permanently decreased the probability
of obtaining habeas relief but failed to accomplish its objective of
streamlining and expediting habeas litigation.
Section I explains the significance of the Teague holding and the
key provisions of AEDPA in the context of the habeas regimes preceding
Teague and AEDPA. Section II provides a conceptual framework for
analyzing the empirical impact of Teague and AEDPA and discusses alternative hypotheses for their causal relationships to judicial efficiency
and the availability of habeas relief. Section III describes the data,
sources, and steps taken to make the data suitable for analysis. Section IV explains the empirical methodology. Section V describes the
models estimated and briefly discusses the estimation results. Section VI
provides a detailed interpretation of the estimation results.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS

The writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to obtain immediate
relief from unlawful confinement by challenging the constitutionality of
his or her conviction and sentence. The writ, which is inherited from the
central courts of medieval England, 4 is such a deeply valued legal tradition that the framers incorporated the writ into the United States Constitution. The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
3 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
4

2003).

LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS

CORPUS

9-10 (Foundation Press

2006]

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HABEAS CORPUS

suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
''5 In 1867, Congress extended
Safety may require it.
the availability of
habeas corpus, which previously benefited federal prisoners only, to state
prisoners, and granted federal courts jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to
both federal and state prisoners. 6 Today, any inmate may file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus after first challenging his or her conviction
through the appeals and post-conviction relief processes in the intermediate appellate and highest court in the state where he or she was
convicted.
Because the history of habeas corpus doctrine has been well documented, this note provides only a brief overview of key developments in
(a) the standard of review, (b) the retroactivity doctrine, and (c) filing
restrictions to provide a context for analysis.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Prior to AEDPA, under Brown v. Allen, federal courts applied a de
novo standard of review to state court interpretations of questions of federal constitutional law. 7 At that time, federal courts could review state
court adjudications on federal questions, even if the state court's adjudication of those legal claims was full and fair. 8 In contrast, AEDPA mandates a higher degree of deference to state court determinations. AEDPA
provides that federal habeas relief will not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless
the adjudication of that claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or was based on "an unreasonable determination of the facts." 9 This provision is likely to generate
wasteful litigation over a new set of questions that add little value. For
example, what is an "unreasonable application" of federal law? What is
an "unreasonable determination" of facts? Is a factual finding by a prior
court unreasonable if it is merely wrong? The difficulty in addressing
these questions is illustrated by the Supreme Court's fragmented opinion
in Williams v. Taylor,'0 in which the Court provided several definitions
of "unreasonable."

5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
6 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
7 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 462-63 (1953).

8 See id.
9 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2005).
10 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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RETROACTIVITY

In Linkletter v. Walker," the Supreme Court announced that the
U.S. Constitution neither prohibits nor requires the retroactive application of new rules, and that a reviewing court must "weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will fur12
ther or retard its operation."'
Linkletter remained the retroactivity regime until Teague was announced in February 1989. Teague held that new rules would no longer
apply to habeas petitions challenging convictions that became "final" after the announcement of the new rule. 13 First, a new rule should apply
retroactively if it "places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe;" second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if the rule
requires observance of "those procedures that ... are implicit in the con'
cept of ordered liberty. "14

Teague defines a "new rule" as any rule that is not "dictated by
precedent existing at the time the prisoner's conviction becomes final."' 15
Following Teague, the Supreme Court has defined "dictated" as that
which is compelled as a matter of logical deduction from the precedent's
holding, which includes only the "material" facts and result of the prior
case. 16 Just as Teague bars a federal habeas court from entertaining a
claim that rests on a recent Supreme Court decision announcing a new
rule, Teague equally bars a habeas court from itself fashioning a new rule
and then applying that rule to resolve a prisoner's pending claim. 17 A
district court's application of even a settled rule of law to the facts of an
analogous case may also "involve a new rule,""' since even settled law
can be extended if it is applied in a "novel setting."' 19
Even an expansive interpretation of "new rule," at least in theory,
should not decrease the availability of habeas relief permanently; it
should merely delay the full realization of both favorable and unfavorable new rules. Despite this logical conclusion, critics argue that the
II

See 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).

12 See id.

13 A conviction becomes "final" on the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct review or, if no petition for certiorari was filed, the date on which the time for
filing a petition expired. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987).
14 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.

15 Id. (emphasis in the original).
16 See generally Linda Meyer, "Nothing we say matters ": Teague and the New Rules, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1994).
17 YACKLE, supra note 4, at 81.

18 Id. (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990)).
19 YACKLE, supra note 4, at 81 (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992)).
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Court's expansive interpretation of "new rule" significantly restricts the
capacity of federal courts to adjudicate habeas claims because Teague's
"dictated by precedent" test is "virtually impossible to satisfy," 20 and
thus bars federal courts from entertaining claims based even on legal
21
principles that are not genuinely new in any ordinary sense.
C.

LIMITATIONS ON FILINGS

Prior to AEDPA, there was no statute of limitations on habeas petitions. A prisoner could file a habeas petition even several years after his
or her conviction became final. AEDPA imposes a 180-day filing limitation on prisoners under a sentence of death, and a one-year limitation on
all other federal and state prisoners. 22 This statute of limitations begins
to run when the prisoner's conviction becomes "final. ' 23 In addition,
AEDPA eliminates a federal court's discretion to choose to hear a claim
in a successive application that was also presented in a prior application,
mandating dismissal, with limited exceptions. 24 Both of these AEDPA
provisions aim to streamline habeas corpus by encouraging the consolidation of all claims into a single petition and eliminating abuse of the
petition process by prisoners. Prior to the adoption of AEDPA, prisoners
on death row could postpone filing frivolous habeas petitions and file
several successive petitions to delay imposition of their death sentence.
Although AEDPA aimed to streamline the habeas corpus process
and to reduce the number of frivolous petitions, AEDPA has produced no
impact on filing rates to date, with the exception of a temporary spike in
filings per prisoner 12 months after AEDPA's enactment when prisoners
rushed to file petitions in order to benefit from law of the pre-AEDPA
regime. 25 In addition to producing no benefit in terms of reducing frivolous filings, critics of AEDPA suggest that its notoriously poor drafting
and complex set of standards might decrease efficiency in litigating
habeas claims.
It is rank foolishness to think that lawyers and courts,
not to mention prison inmates proceeding pro se, can digest and apply the new rules in any sensible, predictable
way. AEDPA thus promises ever more frustration. The
20 Meyer, supra note 16, at 424.
21 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1748-49 (1991); Ann Woolhandler,
Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 638-44 (1993).
22 See 110 Stat. 1214, §105.
23 See id.
24 See 28 U.S.C. §2244(b).
25 See Fred L. Cheesman, Brian J. Ostrom, & Roger A. Hanson, A Tale of Two Laws
Revisited: Investigating the Impact of the PrisonerLitigationReform Act and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 64 (2004).
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new standards hold out the hope that a few prisoners
may be able to satisfy their considerable demands and
thus invite many desperate prisoners to try. That, of
course, crowds federal dockets with cases requiring litigation over threshold procedural issues. At the same
time, the new standards are so demanding that almost all
26
the prisoners who make the attempt will fail.
II.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Among the competing policy goals of habeas doctrine are those of
general allocative efficiency and mechanical efficiency-although
mechanical efficiency is a form of allocative efficiency, for the purposes
of this discussion, it will be useful to distinguish between the two. General allocative efficiency refers to how well scarce judicial and governmental resources are allocated to their most beneficial uses. Thus,
decreasing the filing of frivolous claims enhances allocative efficiency
by freeing up scarce judicial and governmental resources to be allocated
to more beneficial activities, such as expeditiously litigating meritorious
claims or mediating settlement. Mechanical efficiency, in contrast, refers
to the speed with which claims already in the judicial system are disposed of through judgment, dismissal, settlement, or otherwise. For example, mechanical efficiency can be enhanced by the announcement of a
new standard or test that aids courts in dismissing clearly frivolous
habeas petitions.
There are two basic measures of judicial efficiency in the habeas
corpus context. First, the habeas petition filing rate (the "Habeas Filing
Rate" or the "Filing Rate"), or number of filings per prisoner, can measure changes in allocative efficiency of the policy regime. If a new rule
is effective at discouraging frivolous habeas filings, a decrease in the
Filing Rate would follow the enactment of that new rule. The second
measure of efficiency is the time required to dispose of a habeas petition,
measured by the time between filing and termination through judgment,
dismissal, or otherwise. Henceforth, the average time required to dispose
of a habeas petition will be referred to as the "Disposal Time." This
serves as a proxy for mechanical efficiency, since it indicates the effectiveness of the judicial system in disposing of claims that have already
entered the litigation process.
These measures are not without limitations, and they can lead to
erroneous inferences when examined separately or out of context. An
apparent decrease in mechanical efficiency, suggested by an increase in
the Disposal Time, may actually signal an increase in general allocative
26 See Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L.R. 1731, 1741 (2000).
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efficiency, or vice versa. For example, general allocative efficiency may
be enhanced by a new rule of law that discourages frivolous filings; if
fewer frivolous claims are filed, a greater percentage of the claims that
are filed will be meritorious, and thus will require more time to dispose
of.27 In this scenario, mechanical efficiency will appearto have declined
because of the increase in the Disposal Time, even though allocative efficiency has increased. In other words, it would require more time to dispose of a habeas petition, on average, for reasons having nothing to do
with the court's competence, but rather, having to do with the composition of the petitions filed. Thus, the Disposal Time is not a perfect proxy
for mechanical efficiency. However, as long as changes in the Disposal
Time, the Filing Rate, and the "Success Rate" (the percentage of habeas
petitions that result in a judgment for the petitioner) are analyzed jointly,
these measures can be relied on to assess the impact of Teague and
AEDPA on judicial efficiency.
A.

HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TEAGUE

RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE

The Teague retroactivity doctrine could have either increased or decreased efficiency. Teague may have caused a decrease in the Disposal
Time because, in theory, courts are now obligated to hold that new rules
do not apply rather than adjudicate claims under new rules, after determining whether new rules pass the Linkletter test for retroactivity. 28 The
contrary impact on the Disposal Time is equally logical; Teague may
have merely replaced time formerly devoted to adjudicating the merits
with litigation over which rules are "new rules" and whether Teague's
limited exceptions apply.
There is a general consensus among legal scholars that Teague severely restricted the ability of federal courts to grant habeas relief because of its expansive definition of "new rule."'29 If this hypothesis is
correct, Teague should have resulted in either a decrease in the Success
Rate or a decrease in the Filing Rate, or both. If prisoners were unresponsive to Teague, the Filing Rate would remain constant but fewer
claims would succeed, since at least some claims filed would involve
novel factual situations that depend on a new rule. However, if prisoners
responded to the greater difficulty in obtaining habeas relief by refraining
from filing when their claim depended on a new rule, there might be little
27 Successful habeas petitions have a higher Disposal Time than unsuccessful petitions,
suggesting a positive correlation between Disposal Time and the merits of a petition. See infra

§ In.
28 Linkletter v. Walker, Warden, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
29 See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 4, at 88; FALLON &
1748-49; WOOLHANDLER, supra note 21, at 638-44.

MELTZER,

supra note 21, at
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or no decrease in the Success Rate. The former proposition is more
likely, since most prisoners, many of whom are unrepresented by counsel
after conviction, are unlikely to have the sophistication to recognize
when a claim relies on a "new rule." In any event, there would have to
be a decrease in the Filing Rate, a decrease in the Success Rate, or a
decrease in both to suggest that Teague decreased the availability of
habeas relief.
B.

HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE CONSEQUENCES

OF

AEDPA

AEDPA's primary purpose is to streamline and expedite federal
habeas corpus litigation. 30 Yackle proposes that, in the long run, this
purpose may be realized, but in the near term, this is unlikely because
federal courts face the challenge of interpreting AEDPA's numerous features, which are notorious for their poor drafting. 31 If Yackle's proposition is correct, AEDPA would be followed by a temporary decrease in
mechanical efficiency (an increase in the Disposal Time), followed by a
long-term increase in mechanical efficiency (a decrease in the Disposal
Time). However, as discussed in Section VI.B, the actual outcome is a
temporary increase in the Disposal Time, with no long-term positive or
negative impact on the Disposal Time.
AEDPA is also logically expected to result in a decreased Filing
Rate. The provision requiring dismissal of a claim presented in a second
or successive habeas corpus application that has also been presented in a
prior application may increase allocative efficiency by discouraging successive duplicative applications and encouraging consolidation of claims
into a single application, thus decreasing the Filing Rate. AEDPA may
also increase mechanical efficiency by mandating courts to dismiss duplicative claims rather than relitigating them. This latter effect would
manifest as a decrease in the Disposal Time for unsuccessful claims.
The AEDPA provision that requires federal courts to show deference to the determination of state courts, provided that these determinations are neither "contrary to" nor an "unreasonable application of'
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, 32 is
likely to affect both the Success Rate and Disposal Time. Because
greater deference will be given to state determinations, petitioners are
less likely to prevail. This provision is unlikely to lead to a decline in
habeas filings because it is a confusing standard whose implications are
not immediately apparent to prisoners. Thus, this provision will most
likely be reflected by a decrease in the Disposal Time following AEDPA,
because it will often relieve federal courts from conducting de novo fac30 YACKLE, supra note 4, at 56.

31 Id. at 56-57.
32 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).
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tual determinations and force them instead to place greater reliance on
state court judgments. On the other hand, courts may now find themselves burdened with lengthy litigation over whether a state court's legal
determinations are "contrary to" or an "unreasonable" application of federal law, and whether its factual determinations are "reasonable." This
effect would increase the Disposal Time after AEDPA's enactment. Of
course, these effects are not mutually exclusive. It is quite possible that
the greater deference to state judgments will reduce time spent litigating
the substantive merits, while increasing the time spent litigating whether
the state court's determinations are "contrary to" or "unreasonable." As
a result, whether there is an increase or a decrease in the Disposal Time
following AEDPA will depend on whether the efficiency gains from the
decreased time allocated to de novo review and relitigation of duplicative
successive claims outweigh the extra time required to litigate over the
new issues created by AEDPA. Thus, the change in the Disposal Time
will measure the "net effect" of AEDPA on mechanical efficiency in
disposing of habeas petitions, especially meritless ones.
III.

DATA

Data on habeas and prisoner civil rights cases from 1970 to 2003
was obtained from the Federal Court Cases Integrated Data Base 33 (including petitions filed by inmates sentenced to death) and organized by
monthly increments to capture both short-term and long-term fluctuations in the Disposal Time, Filing Rate, and Success Rate. All cases still
pending or terminated in federal district courts during statistical years
1983 through 2003 are included in the database. 34 Prison population sta35
tistics were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
33 FEDERAL

JUDICIAL CENTER,

FEDERAL

COURT

CASES:

INTEGRATED

DATA

BASE,

1970-2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 (ICPSR 8429) [Computer file]. 3rd ICPSR version. Washington,
DC: Federal Judicial Center [producer], 2003. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for
Political and Social Research [distributor], 2004, available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
34 Up to 1992, the reporting period, or "statistical year," went from July through June
(e.g., statistical year 1990 covered the period July 1989 through June 1990). In 1992, the
statistical reporting period was changed to conform to the federal government's standard fiscal
year, October through September (e.g., fiscal year 1993 covered the period October 1992
through September 1993). FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 33, at FEDERAL COURT
CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-2000, Part 103: Civil Terminations, 1996 Codebook,
at 7. To ensure the data was not distorted by this change, I excluded additional copies of
duplicate observations.
35 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. Nos. NCJ 195189
(2002),NCJ 188207 (2001), NCJ 183476 (2000), NCJ 175687 (1999), NCJ 170014 (1998),
NCJ 164619 (1997), NCJ 161132 (1996), NCJ 151654 (1995), PRISONERS IN (YEAREND) ANNUAL (1983-2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. Nos. NCJ 192929 (1998), NCJ 177613 (1997),
NCJ 170013 (1996), NCJ 163916 (1995), NCJ 160091 (1994), NCJ 156241 (1993), CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, (annual release from 1993-1998), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm.
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Several adjustments to the data were necessary to correct the following: (1) errors in recording the data, (2) duplicate observations, and
(3) nonrandom sampling. To eliminate obvious errors, I excluded any
observations reporting a termination date prior to the filing date and any
observations that appeared to be duplicates. 36 The nature and resolution
of the third problem is discussed below.
The data on habeas and prisoner civil rights claims were gathered
from a database that has a separate datafile for each statistical year
("SY") and category (civil terminations, civil pending, appellate terminations, appellate pending, etc.). For example, the 1970 civil terminations
datafile contains information on every civil case terminated in a federal
37
district court in the United States during the SY 1970 reporting period.
Years that fall late in the sample include filings that took a relatively
short time to dispose of but not those with long enough Disposal Times
to be terminated after SY 2003. For example, among all federal habeas
claims filed in 2002, the only ones included in the sample are those terminated prior to the end of SY 2003. Thus, data files for later statistical
years are likely to underestimate the average Disposal Time, as well as
the Success Rate, since there is a correlation between the Disposal Time
and Success Rate, as illustrated by the chart below.
HABEAS PETITION SUCCESS RATE
10%
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Disposal Time in Years
The nonrandom sampling problem is mitigated by cutting off the
tail ends of the sample, where the underestimation of the Disposal Time
and Success Rate are most severe. Thus, only cases filed between June
36 An observation was considered a "duplicate" if it was: filed in the same circuit, district, and office; had the same docket number; and was filed on the same date and terminated
on the same date as another observation or observations in the sample.
37 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 33, at FEDERAL COURT CASES: LNTECRATED DATA BASE, 1970-2000, Part 103: Civil Terminations, 1996 Codebook, at 7.
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1983 and September 2001 are used in the analysis, 38 although data is
available for all cases terminated prior to September 2003, which includes cases filed after September 2001. Ninety percent of cases filed in
September 2001 are terminated prior to September 2003 and are therefore included in the sample. Although this solution is far from perfect,
underestimation of the Disposal Time in later periods does not undermine the validity of the inferences drawn from the estimation results.
The danger presented by underestimation of the Disposal Time in later
time periods is that the data may erroneously suggest that AEDPA,
which took effect in April 1996, was followed by a long-term decrease in
the Disposal Time. However, a contrary result is observed, as discussed
below in Section VI; AEDPA temporarily increased the Disposal Time
for meritless claims, and had no observable long-term effect on the Disposal Time.
IV.

EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

This note employs interrupted time series analysis to evaluate the
impact of Teague and AEDPA on the Success Rate, Filing Rate, and
Disposal Time. 39 The methodology used is as follows. First, I generated
monthly time series variables from the raw cross-sectional data in the
Federal Court Cases Integrated Data Base (listed and described in Table 1). Second, I employed the iterative procedure described in
McDowall et al. 40 for identifying ARIMA (autoregressive integrated
moving average) intervention analysis models. Third, I selected among
alternative models by analyzing the estimation results and measures of
goodness of fit.
The iterative procedure for identifying an ARIMA model is described in detail in McDowall et al.; thus, this note will only briefly describe and identify departures in method from the McDowall approach.
The first step of the McDowall iterative procedure is to examine the ACF
(autocorrelation function) and PACF (partial autocorrelation function)
for observations of the dependent variable in the pre-intervention period 4 ' to determine whether the process is autoregressive
[ARIMA(p,0,0)] or moving average [ARIMA(0,0,q)], what the likely or38 Although there is accurate and complete data available as early as July 1979, it was
not possible to include these early observations in the analysis because the measure of prisoner
population used as the denominator in the Habeas Filing Rate variable was only available from
1977 until 1998, and since prisoner population is lagged 6 years in the denominator, the earliest year in which the Habeas Filing Rate could be generated is 1983.
39 See DAVID McDOWALL ET AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS (James Fennessey et al., eds., Sage Publications 1980).
40 See id.

41 The event being analyzed, here Teague and AEDPA, is often referred to as an
"intervention."
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der of the process is, and whether the process is stationary ("Step 1").
The second step is to difference the series if it is not stationary and specify and estimate an ARIMA(p,d,q) pulse or step model based on the ACF
and PACF ("Step 2"). The third step is to examine the ACF of the preintervention residuals obtained from the estimation for serial correlation
("Step 3"). If the Q-statistic for key lags (in this situation low-order
lags-those under 12, and seasonal lags-12, 24, 36, etc.) is significant
or there is a spike in the ACF, Step 2 must be repeated-specification
and estimation of a new model-and then Step 3 must be repeatedexamination of the ACFs of pre-intervention residuals. This process is
repeated until obtaining a model whose pre-intervention residuals are
free from spikes and significant Q-statistics for key lags. This iterative
process was used for each of 16 models tested.
This study departs from the McDowall approach in several ways.
First, interrupted time series analysis (also called intervention analysis,
impact analysis, or event studies) is usually used to analyze the impact of
a single event, whereas this study examines the impact of two separate
events: (1) the announcement of the Teague retroactivity doctrine and (2)
the enactment of AEDPA. To eliminate the difficulty in distinguishing
between the effects of two interventions occurring over the same time
span, this note analyzes the events separately and restricts the time period
for each event. Thus, the analysis of Teague's impact excludes all data
points after the enactment of AEDPA. Similarly, analysis of AEDPA's
impact includes only post-Teague observations.
The second departure from the McDowall approach is a variation of
the standard pulse model. This note estimates both a step model and a
pulse model for each dependent variable and intervention. A step model
divides the time period examined into two parts-pre-intervention and
post-intervention-by including a binary dummy variable equal to 0 prior
to the intervention and equal to 1 after the intervention. Thus, a step
model tests for an abrupt permanent impact. In contrast, a pulse model
includes as a dependent variable a binary dummy equal to 1 at the moment of the intervention and equal to 0 both before and after the intervention; this standard model tests for an abrupt temporary impact at the
moment of intervention. The pulse models employed here define the
"moment" of intervention differently. Whereas a standard pulse model
dummy is equal to 1 only at the time of the intervention, the pulse
dummy variables in this analysis are equal to 1 for the month of the
intervention and for the 12 months following the intervention, and equal
to 0 for all other months. For example, the pulse dummy variable used to
analyze the effects of AEDPA ("AEDPA-Pulse") equals 1 in months
April 1996 to April 1997, and 0 for all other months. The reason for
modification of the standard pulse model is that Teague or AEDPA may
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have had a temporary impact that was realized several months after the
event rather than instantly. In the lawmaking context, 13 months is a

reasonable definition of the "moment" of intervention because it is a
short enough duration to be distinguished from a permanent impact, yet
long enough to capture slightly delayed reactions of litigants and federal
district courts to a change in law.
A third departure from the McDowall methodology is that instead of
seasonal differencing, I use seasonal dummy variables, one for each
month. The seasonal dummies are included in all 16 equations, but their
coefficients are not reported in the results tables.
V.

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

The Disposal Times for successful and failed habeas claims are analyzed separately for several reasons. First, the Disposal Time correlates
with the probability of success; successful petitions take longer to dispose of than failed petitions, as illustrated by the chart below. Analyzing
the processing time for successful and unsuccessful claims separately implicitly controls for this correlation.
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Second, it is possible that an event will have different effects on the
processing time for meritorious and meritless claims. For example, the
AEDPA provision requiring dismissal of claims filed in a prior habeas
application may decrease the Disposal Time for meritless, or unsuccessful, claims by making it easier to dismiss such filings. On the other
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hand, this provision may discourage prisoners from filing extremely frivolous claims, which would cause the composition of failed habeas filings
to become, on average, more meritorious (since the most frivolous claims
drop out), which may manifest as an increase the average Disposal Time
of the claims that are filed (since disposal time correlates with the
probability of success). This AEDPA provision, however, should have
absolutely no effect on the processing time of meritorious, or successful,
claims. Thus, the only way to discern the precise effect of an event on
mechanical efficiency is to analyze the Disposal Time separately for successful and failed petitions, henceforth referred to as the "Successful Disposal Time" and "Failed Disposal Time," respectively.
Two necessary controls are included in the Disposal Time models.
First, the average Disposal Time of all failed and successful federal civil
claims is included in the Failed Disposal Time and Successful Disposal
Time models, respectively. This is to control for changes in the Disposal
Time that are common to all federal civil litigation that cannot be attributed to changes in habeas policy. Second, "Docket Crowdedness" is
controlled for, which is a count of all civil claims in the federal court
system during that month. A case is deemed to be "in" the system during
month t if (a) it was filed during month t, or (b) it was filed in a prior
month, t - k, but was not yet disposed of at the beginning of month t.
This variable is controlled for because the Disposal Time will be higher
when the docket is crowded and judicial resources are stretched. As
shown in Table 2, this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level
for all Failed Disposal Time models, confirming the logical inference
that when dockets are crowded, it takes longer to dispose of meritless
claims. Surprisingly, however, the coefficient on Docket Crowdedness is
not significant in the Successful Disposal Time models, indicating that
the Disposal Time for meritorious habeas petitions is unaffected by
courts' level of congestion.
The "Filing Rate" is defined as the number of habeas petitions filed
per six-year lagged prisoner population. Thus, the Filing Rate is obtained by dividing the number of habeas petitions filed in month m by the
prisoner population in month m-72. The relevant population is prisoners
sentenced to more than one year because prisoners with shorter sentences
are unlikely to exhaust state post-conviction remedies, and thus become
eligible for federal habeas relief, before their sentences expire. The population denominator is lagged 72 months (six years) to account for the
time it takes prisoners to exhaust state remedies. In other words, because
there are often several years between conviction and filing of a habeas
petition, an increase in the prison population in year t will probably not
lead to an increase in the number of habeas petitions until n years later.
A lag of six years was chosen after examining the coefficients of correla-
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tion between various lags of prisoner population and the number of
habeas filings. The six-year lag of prisoner population most strongly
correlated with the habeas filing level, consistent with Cheesman et al.'s
similar determination of regular prisoner population (includes prisoners
42
with sentences less than one year in length).
I estimated a series of equations analogous to the Filing Rate models reported in equations 13 through 16 of Table 3 (the "Filing Rate
Models"). This series of equations, whose estimation results are not reported here, includes the Success Rate and prisoner civil rights filing rate
(the "PCR Filing Rate") as controls. These estimates are not reported,
but the rationale for including these controls and subsequently dropping
them is as follows. The Success Rate (defined as the number of habeas
petitions coded as "judgment for plaintiff' in the Federal Court Cases
Integrated Data Base divided by the total number of habeas filings in that
time period) may influence the Filing Rate because an increase in the
probability of obtaining habeas relief may cause prisoners to respond
with an increase in filings. However, in all four alternative Filing Rate
Models (TEAGUE-Step, TEAGUE-Pulse, AEDPA-Step, and AEDPAPulse), the Success Rate was statistically insignificant. These models
include the PCR Filing Rate because an increase in prisoner civil rights
filings following AEDPA coupled with a decline in habeas filings would
suggest that AEDPA, rather than eliminating the overall burden to courts
from frivolous prisoner claims, may have merely shifted prisoner litigation from habeas petitions to prisoner civil rights complaints. This variable, in all relevant models (AEDPA-Step and AEDPA-Pulse), had a
positive and statistically significant coefficient, refuting the aforementioned hypothesis. Thus, it would be erroneous to conclude that the prisoner civil rights filing rate "causes" changes in the habeas petition rate in
any sense; the positive correlation between these filing rates suggests
that, rather than being substitute forms of post-conviction relief (which
would be indicated by a negative correlation), the two types of filing
rates are influenced by common factors affecting prisoner litigation in
general, such as the availability of free counsel in pursuing post-conviction remedies. Because the aforementioned analysis suggests that neither
the Success Rate nor the PCR Filing Rate is a necessary control variable
in the Filing Rate Models, these variables were excluded from the equations reported and discussed in this note.
In models analyzing Teague and AEDPA's impact on the Success
Rate (models in which Success Rate is the dependent variable), the Filing
Rate is controlled for because a decrease in the Filing Rate may indicate
a decline in frivolous filings, which would result in a higher percentage
42 See CHEESMAN, OSTROM & HANSON, supra note 25, at 64.
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of meritorious or successful petitions. Therefore, controlling for the Filing Rate makes it possible to distinguish between a shift in the Success
rate caused by a change in the difficulty of obtaining relief and a shift
caused by a change in the composition of claims filed. In all four models, shown in Table 3, equations 9 through 12 (the "Success Rate Models"), this variable has a negative coefficient, consistent with the
aforementioned hypothesis, but is not significant.
The possibility that the Filing Rate is endogenous in the Success
Rate Models-that a higher probability of success encourages more filings-has been ruled out. Hausman tests for endogeneity of the Filing
Rate were performed for all four Success Rate models; the null hypothesis of exogeneity could not be rejected at even a marginally significant
level. Furthermore, as discussed above, in models estimated with the
Filing Rate as the dependent variable and the Success Rate as an explanatory variable, the coefficient on Success Rate was not even marginally
significant, further ruling out the possibility of endogeneity. Another set
of equations analogous to the Success Rate Models with 12- and 24month lags (not reported) were estimated to account for the time it may
take prisoners to perceive and respond to a change in the probability of
successfully obtaining habeas relief. These estimations returned similar
results. Thus, the Filing Rate can safely be treated as an exogenous control variable.
VI.
A.

DISCUSSION

EMPIRICAL IMPACT OF TEAGUE

Teague had neither a temporary nor a permanent impact on the Success Rate or the Filing Rate, suggesting no effect whatsoever on allocative efficiency. However, Teague did undermine mechanical efficiency
by increasing the Disposal Time of failed claims permanently and increasing the Disposal Time for successful petitions temporarily. As illustrated in Table 2, equations 1, 2, 5, and 6, the intervention variable is
positive and highly significant in the step model for Failed Disposal
Time and the pulse model for Successful Disposal Time. There are several explanations for this pattern. The temporary impact on meritorious
(successful) habeas petitions is most likely due to temporary confusion in
applying the Teague doctrine. The permanent increase in the Disposal
Time for meritless (failed) habeas petitions requires a more careful
examination.
One explanation for this permanent increase in Disposal Time is
that Teague generated a new set of procedural requirements and issues
needing to be litigated whose burden outweighed any reduction in time
formerly spent on litigating the merits. Now courts must determine
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whether a claim is based on a "new rule," and if it is, courts must determine whether the limited exceptions of Teague apply.
An alternative explanation is that Teague, by making it more difficult to obtain habeas relief, discouraged filings that were the most frivolous. If the extremely frivolous filings drop out of the failed population,
the remaining cases would possess relatively greater merit and therefore
take longer to resolve (recall that Disposal Time is correlated with the
probability of success). However, in such a situation there should be at
least a marginal decline in the Filing Rate and possibly the Success Rate,
and there is no such decline, as illustrated by equations 9, 10, 13, and 14
of Table 2. Thus, the only robust conclusion is that Teague impaired
courts' efficiency in disposing of meritless claims.
Surprisingly, Teague was not followed by a decline in either the
Success Rate or the Filing Rate (equations 9, 10, 13, and 14). Thus,
critics' characterization of Teague as severely restricting the availability
of habeas relief appears exaggerated, if not completely inaccurate. As
suggested in Section I.B, even an expansive interpretation of "new rule"
should be expected only to delay the full impact of both favorable and
unfavorable new rules, not to permanently decrease the availability of
habeas relief.
In summary, the estimation results are as follows: First, Teague
permanently increased the Failed Disposal Time and temporarily increased the Successful Disposal Time. Second, Teague has demonstrated no impact on the Success Rate, suggesting that it has not made
habeas relief more difficult to obtain as critics have suggested. Third,
Teague has made no impact on the Filing Rate. Thus, Teague's only
long-term empirical impact is impairment of mechanical efficiency in
disposing of meritless claims.
B.

EMPIRICAL IMPACT OF

AEDPA

As shown in Table 2, equation 4, the AEDPA-Pulse variable is a
positive and highly significant determinant of Failed Disposal Time,
whereas the coefficient on the AEDPA-Step variable is not (equation 3).
Furthermore, the Akaike Information Criterion (the "AIC") and Schwartz
Information Criterion (the "SIC") are more negative in the pulse model
than in the step model of Failed Disposal Time. 43 Thus, the pulse model
is a better fit, implying that AEDPA temporarily increased the Disposal
Time for meritless claims, without permanently affecting the Failed Disposal Time. The temporary increase in the Disposal Time of meritless
claims is probably due to confusion and delay resulting from lower
43 The AIC and SIC are measures of goodness-of-fit. A smaller, or more negative, value
of either AIC or SIC indicates a better model.
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courts' initial clumsiness in applying AEDPA's provisions. Thus, since
no long-term impact on Failed Disposal Time resulted (the coefficient in
the step model is insignificant), AEDPA did not improve mechanical efficiency in the disposal of meritless claims.
An alternative explanation is that AEDPA increased allocative efficiency by discouraging the most frivolous of the meritless filings, leading to an increase in the average processing time, not due to any decrease
in efficiency, but due rather to a change in the composition of meritless
filings. However, the absence of a long-term decrease in the filing rate
contradicts this explanation.
Despite the apparent weakness of the AEDPA-Step Disposal Time
model, it is possible that AEDPA's long-term impact on Disposal Time
has been to worsen mechanical efficiency, but that this impact is not
reflected by the estimation results because the Disposal Time is underestimated in later years due to the nonrandom sampling problem discussed
in Section III.
Consistent with Cheesman et al.'s findings, 44 equations 15 and 16 in
Table 2 indicate that AEDPA temporarily increased the Filing Rate and
did not achieve its objective of permanently decreasing the Filing Rate.
In the AEDPA-Pulse Filing Rate Model, the intervention term is positive
and highly significant, indicating a temporary positive impact on filing
rates. The step model is a poorer model, indicated by its higher AIC and
SIC and insignificant intervention term. Furthermore, the coefficient on
the intervention term in the AEDPA-Step Model is not statistically significant. Thus, AEDPA produced no long-term impact on the Filing
Rates.
AEDPA did, however, make a significant long-term impact on the
Success Rate. The intervention variable in equation 11, the AEDPAStep Model of Success Rate, has a negative and highly significant coefficient, indicating that AEDPA permanently decreased the probability of
obtaining habeas relief.
In summary, these findings compel several conclusions. The first is
that AEDPA failed to streamline the writ of habeas corpus. AEDPA produced no long-term decrease in the filing rate, so its statute of limitations
and mandate of dismissal for successive applications presenting the same
claims failed to lighten the burden of habeas petitions on the court system. Second, these provisions, combined with AEDPA's provision for
increased deference to state determinations, did not enhance mechanical
efficiency in processing habeas petitions, since the Disposal Times for
both meritorious and meritless claims did not decline in the years follow44 See CHEESMAN, OSTROM & HANSON, supra note 25, at 64.

2006]

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ing AEDPA, and may in fact have risen. Third, AEDPA permanently
decreased the probability of success in obtaining habeas relief.
C.

BROADER JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

If legislation and Supreme Court decisions served their purported
function of resolving circuit court splits and otherwise resolving legal
ambiguities, major decisions and legislation would cause a decrease in
the Disposal Time, since lower courts would benefit from a new rule or
standard that quickly resolved issues that previously had to be litigated.
The permanent increase in the Disposal Time that followed Teague and
the temporary increase that followed AEDPA suggest the opposite; when
Congress or the Supreme Court attempt to declare or clarify what the law
is, they may instead render the law even more ambiguous.
The consequences flowing logically from the Teague holding are
illustrative. In Teague, the Supreme Court overruled Linkletter,45 which
had been settled law for over two decades, and criticized its standard for
leading to "inconsistent results" and the "disparate treatment of similarly
situated defendants. '46 In an attempt to correct these deficiencies, the
Court fashioned a new standard that resulted in a host of new issues
lower courts must address. First, courts are faced with the challenge of
determining whether a claim depends on a "new rule." If so, the court
must determine if one of the exceptions applies; if not, the court must
determine what the law was at the time that a prisoner's conviction became final. Additionally, if the court is attempting to apply settled law to
novel facts or make a serious legal judgment, it must determine whether
this amounts to the creation of a new rule. Thus, in an attempt to correct
deficiencies in the former regime, the Supreme Court produced a complex set of standards that appears even more problematic in light of the
permanent increase in Disposal Time for meritless claims following the
Teague decision. This decline in efficiency suggests Teague produced a
disorienting rather than settling effect on the application of habeas
doctrine.
Similarly, AEDPA generated more legal questions than legal answers for courts, as suggested by the short-term increase in the Disposal
Time for failed petitions following AEDPA's enactment. AEDPA's
"contrary to" and "unreasonable" standards 47 are particularly troublesome. The Supreme Court's attempt in Williams to apply AEDPA's "unreasonable" standard produced a fragmented opinion in which six
justices joined in Parts I, II, and IV of the opinion of the Court, three
justices joined in Part II, two justices joined in Part II except as to a
45 See generally Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618.
46 Teague, 489 U.S. at 302-303.
47 See generally Williams, 529 U.S. 362.
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footnote, two justices joined in a separate opinion, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, and two justices joined in a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 48 In light of the Supreme
Court's fragmentation over AEDPA, it is no surprise that shortly following AEDPA's enactment, lower courts were confused about how to interpret its provisions.
The implications of this study are not limited to the habeas corpus
context. This study undermines the assumption regarding judicial lawmaking and legislation that the Supreme Court and Congress primarily
resolve questions of unsettled law and provide clearer and more uniform
legal standards. The impact of Teague and AEDPA suggests the contrary: the Supreme Court and Congress may create more numerous and
problematic legal issues and standards than they successfully resolve.
CONCLUSION
Teague v. Lane permanently increased the amount of time required
to dispose of meritless habeas petitions and temporarily increased the
time required to dispose of meritorious claims. Thus, Teague's net effect
was to increase the burden of habeas litigation on federal courts, since it
now takes longer to dispose of meritless claims. Also, contrary to virtually all characterizations of Teague as severely restricting the availability
of habeas corpus, Teague did not decrease the probability of a petitioner's success.
Although AEDPA permanently decreased the probability of obtaining a successful habeas petition, it failed to achieve its main objectives: to reduce frivolous filings and to streamline the disposal of habeas
petitions. AEDPA failed to produce long-term declines in the Filing
Rate or Disposal Rate, despite Congress's intent that the AEDPA provisions requiring dismissal of duplicate successive claims would, at the
very least, expedite the disposal of meritless claims. Thus, despite observers' regard of AEDPA as a "complete overhaul" of federal habeas
doctrine, AEDPA appears to have achieved nothing in terms of judicial
efficiency. However, since AEDPA is still a fairly recent enactment in
the context of a continually evolving federal habeas jurisprudence, it is
possible that the limited sample period examined here, which ends in
September 2001, has simply not captured the long-term effects of
AEDPA.
The empirical impact of the Teague decision and AEDPA are
poorly aligned with the expectations of the legal community and the intent of their creators. Therefore, this note's findings suggest that the
practical implications of the lawmaking process, whether judicial or leg48 See id.
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islative, are difficult to predict and are in fact badly mistaken by both
observers and those who create the law. Therefore, additional empirical
analysis of the practical implications of statutory and common law may
be useful to develop and test theories that shed light on which circumstances, if any, result in effective lawmaking-lawmaking that achieves
its intended objective-and which circumstances result in ineffective
lawmaking.
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TABLE 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
VARIABLE LABEL

TYPE

DEFINITION

SUCCESSRATE

Continuous

Habeas Success Rate, defined as the number
of petitions coded as "judgment for
plaintiff' in the U.S. Courts database filed
in month tdivided by the total number of
habeas filings in month t

DISPOSAL TIME

Continuous

Average number of years between filing and
termination for all cases filed in month t

Successful Habeas Filings

Continuous

Average Disposal Time of habeas petitions
coded as "judgment for plaintiff' filed in
month t

Failed Habeas Filings

Continuous

Average Disposal Time of habeas petitions
coded as "judgment for defendant" filed in
month t

Successful Civil Filings

Continuous

Average Disposal Time of all federal civil
cases coded as "judgment for plaintiff' filed
in month t

Failed Civil Filings

Continuous

Average Disposal Time of all federal civil
cases coded as "judgment for defendant"
filed in month t

FILINGRATEHABEAS

Continuous

Habeas petitions filed per prisoner capita,
obtained by dividing the number of habeas
petitions filed in month t by the number of
prisoners with a sentence of over one year
in month t-72 (6 year lag)

FILINGRATEPCR

Continuous

Prisoner civil rights (PCR) filings per one
thousand prisoner capita, obtained by
dividing the number of PCR claims filed
during the quarter by the total prisoner
population on Dec. 31st of the calendar year

DOCKETCROWDEDNESS

Continuous

Number of cases on the docket at anytime
during month t

TEAGUESTEP

Binary
Dummy

Dummy equal to I after February 1989, the
month the Teague decision was issued, and
equal to 0 at all times prior to Teague

TEAGUEPULSE

Binary
Dummy

Dummy equal to I from February 1989 until
February 1990, equal to 0 in all other
periods

AEDPASTEP

Binary
Dummy

Dummy equal to I after April 1996, the
month AEDPA was enacted and became
effective, equal to 0 prior to AEDPA's
enactment

AEDPAPULSE

Binary
Dummy

Dummy equal to I from April 1996 until
April 1997, equal to 0 in all other periods
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